The current diplomatic configuration around the Strait of Hormuz consists of a United States 15-point proposal originally drafted on 25 March 2026 and transmitted via Pakistan, and an Iranian 14-point response submitted on 2 May 2026 and acknowledged as received in United States review on 3 May 2026. The two documents are not symmetrical, and the asymmetry is informative. The earlier post on the Iranian mechanism language read one element of the Iranian text in detail. The earlier post on Pakistan as mediator read the channel through which both texts have moved. This post reads the geometry between the two texts — what each side has put on the table, what each has left off, and where the institutional question of the chokepoint sits in the gap between the two.
What the United States proposal asks of the chokepoint
Public reporting in Israel’s Channel 12 and confirmed in subsequent Western coverage indicates that the United States 15-point proposal of 25 March includes, on the Hormuz question, the following operational asks: complete reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to all transit, end of all sanctions on Iran following compliance, dismantling of Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, handover of Iran’s stockpile of already-enriched uranium to the IAEA, a permanent commitment from Iran not to develop nuclear weapons, full IAEA monitoring of remaining nuclear infrastructure, ending the UN snapback sanctions mechanism, and a one-month ceasefire while terms are negotiated. The full set of fifteen points includes additional asks on regional posture, sponsorship of designated entities, and other sovereignty and security questions that the Channel 12 reporting summarises but does not enumerate point-by-point.
For the chokepoint specifically, the United States ask is “reopening.” That word is a description of the desired output, not a description of the institutional structure that would produce the output. A strait can be reopened in any number of institutional configurations: under the pre-war UNCLOS-only configuration analysed in the 24 April UNCLOS post; under the Iranian unilateral framework analysed in the 30 April new-chapter post; under a hybrid bilateral arrangement; under a multilateral treaty-backed authority on the Suez or Panama model. The United States proposal does not, on the available reporting, specify which of these is the configuration it asks Iran to adopt. The proposal asks for the chokepoint as a status (open) without specifying the chokepoint as a structure.
What the Iranian response says about the chokepoint
The Iranian 14-point response, as reported in NPR, Al Jazeera, The National, and CNBC, includes on the Hormuz question the following: a “new mechanism for the Strait of Hormuz,” lifting of the United States naval blockade, an end to hostilities on all fronts including Lebanon, withdrawal of United States forces from Iran’s periphery, release of frozen Iranian assets, payment of war reparations, lifting of sanctions, guarantees against future military aggression, and a thirty-day deadline for resolution of all issues. The proposal also defers nuclear-program discussions until after the war-ending settlement is in place.
For the chokepoint specifically, the Iranian ask is “a new mechanism.” That phrase is a description of the desired structure, not a description of the operational status the structure would produce. A new mechanism could produce, in operation, the same status the United States is asking for (“reopening”) or it could produce a different status (selectively open, with sanctions-country surcharges, with rial-denominated proceeds, and so on, as the unilateral framework specifies). The Iranian proposal asks for the chokepoint as a structure (mechanism) without specifying the chokepoint as a status.
The geometry of the gap
The two documents address the chokepoint in mirror-image terms. The United States asks for the status without specifying the structure. Iran asks for the structure without specifying the status. The negotiation, if it converges, has to fill in the gap by pairing a structure with a status that both parties accept.
The pairing is, in principle, straightforward. The Suez and Panama Authorities are structures that produce, as their normal operational output, a status of “open to all flag-states on equal commercial terms, with a published tariff differentiated by operationally relevant factors.” If the United States ask of “reopening” is filled in with the Suez or Panama analogue structure, and the Iranian ask of “a new mechanism” is filled in with the Suez or Panama analogue substance, the two asks converge on the same answer. The institutional arithmetic that produces this convergence is what the comparison page walks through.
The pairing is not, however, the only mathematically possible one. The United States ask of “reopening” could be paired with the Iranian unilateral framework’s structure, in which case the strait is reopened on Iranian operational terms — rial-denominated, sanctions-country-surcharged, military-administered, GCC-invited — which the United States compliance posture analysed in the Treasury rules post would not, on the available reporting, accept. The Iranian ask of “a new mechanism” could be paired with the pre-war UNCLOS-only configuration, in which case there is no new mechanism at all, only restoration of the prior arrangement, which the operator class as represented in the 25 April ICS statement has indicated does not by itself meet the requirement either side now sees as necessary.
The space of pairings that produces an outcome both parties can accept and that meets the operator class’s requirement is, by elimination, the space of pairings that uses the treaty-backed authority structure. That space is not, in fact, very large. There are two working examples in the world (Suez, Panama). There is a clear set of design parameters that the existing examples have settled by long practice. The novelty in any Hormuz authority would be in adapting the parameters to the specific riparian, geographic, and political configuration of the strait, not in inventing the institutional category from scratch.
The thirty-day timeline
The Iranian proposal’s thirty-day clock is, taken literally, short for treaty drafting and ratification. It is, however, a reasonable horizon for a framework agreement that names the institutional placeholder, sets a working group with a longer build-out timeline, and provides interim transit arrangements during the build-out. The ICS statement’s operational requirement that there be a recognised counterparty operating on equal-access terms could be met, in the framework version, by an agreed interim arrangement that has the operator class participating in its design. The full institutional build-out — board appointments, statutory framework, treasury, dispute-resolution forum, statistical bulletin, IMO and ICS standing relationships — would proceed over the subsequent months and years, on a timeline more like the post-Torrijos-Carter handover at Panama than like a thirty-day diplomatic resolution.
The thirty days, in this reading, is a clock for getting both parties to a written framework agreement that the operator class can begin to transact against on an interim basis. It is not a clock for delivering the fully-fledged authority. The distinction is important because the negotiation can succeed in the modest sense (framework agreement with placeholders) without yet succeeding in the full sense (working authority on the Suez or Panama model). The modest sense is achievable in thirty days. The full sense is the work that follows.
Where the United States and Iran agree, even now
It is worth being explicit about what the two documents have in common. Both documents, in their chokepoint provisions, treat the strait as a problem that requires resolution within the diplomatic settlement of the war. Neither document treats the chokepoint as something that can be left to the post-war diplomatic clean-up. Both documents implicitly accept that the chokepoint is a structurally-defined problem, not merely an operational one, because both documents place chokepoint provisions in their numbered lists rather than treating the chokepoint as a derivative of the broader settlement. The United States 15-point proposal includes the Hormuz reopening as a numbered ask. The Iranian 14-point response includes the new mechanism as a numbered ask. Both sides have agreed, by the form of their proposals, that Hormuz is one of the substantive items the negotiation has to resolve.
That implicit agreement is, in the site’s reading, the most institutionally significant thing about the present diplomatic configuration. The chokepoint is no longer either side’s afterthought. It is on the numbered list. The site’s argument since 18 April has been that getting the chokepoint onto the numbered list is the precondition for getting an institutional answer to the chokepoint problem. The 15-point and 14-point exchange, taken together, is the moment at which the precondition is met.
The structurally-required answer
The structurally-required answer to the gap between the two documents is the institutional configuration the existing chokepoint authorities have been operating for decades. A statutory or constitutionally-autonomous administering body. A published tariff differentiated by vessel type, tonnage, cargo, and laden condition, on equal commercial terms across flag-states. Dollar-denominated banking with named depository institutions. A monthly statistical bulletin. A recognised dispute-resolution forum operating under UNCLOS. Standing relationships with the IMO, the ICS, the ITF, and the riparian states. Each of those features fills in some of the gap between “reopening” and “new mechanism.” The combination fills in all of it. The proposed rate schedule sets the tariff. The calculator prices a transit against it. The 15-and-14-point exchange is the diplomatic surface against which the institutional answer can now be drafted.
Sources: Israel Channel 12 reporting on the United States 15-point proposal of 25 March 2026; Axios, “Iran offers US deal to reopen Hormuz strait, postpone nuclear talks,” 27 April 2026; Al Jazeera, “What’s in Iran’s latest proposal – and how has the US responded?” 28 April 2026; NPR, “Iran submits a 14-point response to a U.S. proposal to end war,” 2 May 2026; Al Jazeera, “What’s Iran’s 14-point proposal to end the war? And will Trump accept it?” 3 May 2026; The National, “Iran demands peace deal in 30 days in 14-point proposal to Trump,” 3 May 2026; CNBC, “Trump says he is likely to reject Iran peace proposal,” 3 May 2026; House of Commons Library briefing CBP-10637, “US-Iran ceasefire and nuclear talks in 2026”; Suez Canal Authority statutory framework and tariff publications; Panama Canal Authority constitutional and tariff documentation; this site’s prior analyses on the UNCLOS vacuum (24 April), the ICS statement (25 April), the cost stack (23 April), the new-chapter framework (30 April), the Treasury position (30 April), the 14-point mechanism language (4 May), and Pakistan mediation (4 May).