Side-by-side comparison of the three most important maritime chokepoint toll systems in the world: the proposed Hormuz Toll model, the Suez Canal Authority (Egypt), and the Panama Canal Authority. Rates, governance, historical revenues, and worked examples for a representative vessel.
| Dimension | Hormuz | Suez | Panama |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Authority | Proposed multilateral authority (model) | Suez Canal Authority (Egypt) | Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (Panama) |
| Year Established | — | 1956 | 1997 |
| Length | ~39 km (21 nm narrowest) | 193.3 km | 82 km |
| Locks? | No — natural strait | No — sea-level canal | Yes — 3 lock complexes (2 sets after 2016 expansion) |
| Primary Billing Basis | Per-vessel-type (SCNT, DWT, m³, TEU, displacement) | Suez Canal Net Tonnage (SCNT) | Panama Canal Tonnage (PC/UMS) + booking auctions |
| Alternative Route Cost | No viable alternative (only maritime outlet of Gulf) | Cape of Good Hope (~6,000 nm extra) | Cape Horn / Strait of Magellan (~8,000 nm extra) |
| Annual Transits (recent) | ~50,000 (pre-war baseline) | ~24,000 (FY2023) | ~13,000 (FY2023) |
| Governance Model | Multilateral neutral authority (proposed) | Egyptian state authority, independent board | Autonomous constitutional authority |
| Revenue Use | Ring-fenced: infrastructure 40%, environment 25%, security 20%, admin 15% | Egyptian treasury + SCA operations | Panamanian treasury + ACP operations + water programs |
The table below compares the estimated transit toll for a representative 300,000 DWT Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) — the workhorse of Middle East crude exports — through each waterway. The Hormuz column uses this site’s published rate schedule. The Suez and Panama columns use each authority’s published methodology.
| Component | Hormuz | Suez | Panama |
|---|---|---|---|
| Size / Class | Mega (GT ≥ 120,000) | Suezmax-plus | Neo-Panamax (just fits post-expansion) |
| Fixed transit component | $300,000 | — | — |
| Capacity-based component | ~$308,000 (95,000 SCNT × $3.25) | ~$650,000 (laden, ~155,000 SCNT × variable rate bands) | ~$600,000 (PC/UMS tonnage × tier rate) |
| Security / admin fees | $5,000 | Included in transit dues | Reservation auction premium (variable) |
| Typical total | ~$613,000 | ~$650,000–$900,000 | ~$600,000–$1.2M (with slot auction) |
| Alternative route penalty | N/A (no alternative) | +14–20 days via Cape of Good Hope | +12–18 days via Cape Horn |
Figures are order-of-magnitude illustrations based on each authority’s public methodology and typical industry reporting. Actual Suez and Panama bills vary with ballast/laden status, SCA rebate eligibility, and booking-auction clearing prices.
The Suez Canal Net Tonnage standard has been refined since 1873 and is now one of the most thoroughly audited tonnage measurement systems in maritime commerce. Adopting SCNT (or a close equivalent) for Hormuz crude and product tanker billing would give operators a familiar, verifiable basis and remove the largest source of billing disputes.
The SCA has discounted ballast transits for decades, recognizing the lower environmental impact and reduced infrastructure demand. The Hormuz model’s 15% ballast discount is a direct adaptation of this principle.
During the 2023–2024 drought, the Panama Canal Authority’s slot auction system generated hundreds of millions in supplemental revenue without raising base tolls. The Hormuz priority slot surcharge (+12%) is a simpler, rule-based analog that could evolve into a full auction during congestion events.
The ACP is constitutionally autonomous, with canal operations, maintenance, and expansion funded from toll revenue before any transfer to Panama’s general treasury. The Hormuz model proposes a similar 40/25/20/15 split (infrastructure, environment, security, admin) to insulate the operational budget from political cycles.
Hormuz is a deep-water natural strait. Unlike Panama (drought-sensitive) and Suez (dredging-sensitive), Hormuz has no draft-limiting chokepoint that climate or geology can constrict. Infrastructure risk is almost entirely security-driven, not geological.
Suez can be bypassed via the Cape. Panama can be bypassed via Cape Horn. Hormuz cannot be bypassed — there is no maritime alternative for Gulf exports. This makes Hormuz toll pricing less elastic than either comparator and places a stronger obligation on the toll authority to be non-extractive.
Roughly 75–80% of Hormuz tonnage is petroleum and LNG. Suez carries a far more diversified mix (containers, dry bulk, project cargo, Ro-Ro). This concentration amplifies the strategic importance of LNG-specific pricing (m³-based) and the environmental incentives for eco-certified tanker operators.
Both Suez and Panama have clear territorial sovereignty supporting their toll authorities. Hormuz’s northern coast is Iranian; its southern coast is Omani; the shipping lanes straddle the two. A functional toll authority would have to be multilateral by design, not retrofitted.
Estimate a vessel’s Hormuz transit toll using the same rate schedule referenced in this comparison.
$9.4B — all-time record before Red Sea disruption
$5.7B — record high, up 14.4% vs FY2024
~140 ships/day pre-war → ~14/day under blockade (90% collapse)
Cape of Good Hope: +14–20 days. Cape Horn: +12–18 days. Hormuz: no alternative exists.
Full Hormuz tariff tables.
The strait, the rationale, the governance model.
Common questions on calculations and policy.
Analysis of the ongoing 2026 Hormuz crisis.
Suez figures: Suez Canal Authority annual reports (FY2015–FY2024); Statista; Reuters; Euronews. Panama figures: Autoridad del Canal de Panamá financial statements (FY2015–FY2025); LatinNews; Global Trade Magazine. Hormuz baseline: CENTCOM and industry tracking (MarineTraffic, Windward, Lloyd’s List).