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The deal declares the strait reopened, but contains no compliance verification mechanism, no way for any party to confirm the reopening is genuine and sustained. Iran can say it is open; the US can say it is open; neither claim is independently checkable. The Monitoring working group watches the parties’ compliance, not the water. The excluded Gulf states cannot confirm what they most need to know, so they hedge. This post reads the verification vacuum, and why the verifier is the institution.

The crisis taught the world’s shipping to go dark. By May, more than two-thirds of non-Iranian transits through Hormuz were switching off AIS, carrying legitimate UAE, Qatari, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi oil through Gulf-of-Oman transfers with transponders off. The dark-fleet tactic, pioneered for sanctions evasion, became a commercial norm for allied oil, and the transparency the market depends on broke in a way that cannot be unseen. A governed strait makes identified transit a condition of passage. This post reads the opacity the vacuum normalized.

Iran re-declared the strait closed on 20-21 June; on 22 June the market rebounded to 25 visible transits in open defiance, French and Qatari LNG carriers and Chinese VLCCs crossing with transponders ON rather than dark. The market is starting to treat Iran’s closures as noise rather than law, which erodes Iran’s leverage. But a market improvising authority by aggregate behavior is not the same as a governed strait, and it is fragile. This post reads both edges.

On 20 June the strait was open and closed at once: the IRGC declared it closed, CENTCOM said traffic flows (55 ships, 17M barrels Saturday), Iran’s own Foreign Ministry said shipping was ‘operating normally,’ and the AIS showed vessels moving. Four answers, including two from one government. A chokepoint with no authority has no authoritative answer to the most basic question — are you open? This post reads the contested status as the symptom it is, and why this site has to run its own traffic light.

Six India-flagged vessels transited inbound on 18 May 2026 in a coordinated cluster under bilateral Iran-India arrangements. The chokepoint is now operationally bifurcated: a compliant fleet under PGSA-administered transit and a holding queue of about 2,000 vessels waiting for the institutional configuration the operator class can use. This post reads the bifurcation, the historical parallel of the 2018-2025 shadow fleet, and what a treaty-backed authority would do to consolidate it.

On April 29, real-time tracking showed three to eight Hormuz transits in 24 hours against a pre-crisis baseline of about 60 vessels per day. Five per cent of normal. The post walks through what is and is not still moving, what a treaty-backed authority’s monthly statistical bulletin would record, and why the throughput floor is an institutional fact rather than only a military one.