Gateway to the Persian Gulf
Thirty non-combatant countries gathered at the Elysee Palace today to launch the Strait of Hormuz Maritime Freedom of Navigation Initiative. The United States was not invited. That absence is the initiative’s most important design choice.
Patrick Pouyanné, CEO of TotalEnergies, told the IMF/World Bank spring meetings that the industry would rather pay to transit Hormuz than face closure — citing Suez and Panama as precedents. He is the first supermajor CEO to publicly endorse the principle of a structured chokepoint toll.
Iran’s military threatens to block the Gulf, Sea of Oman, and Red Sea simultaneously if the US blockade continues. The geography proves why unilateral enforcement fails and why permanent, self-funded chokepoint authorities are the only durable answer.
Global oil supply fell 10.1 mb/d in March. Hormuz throughput collapsed 81%. The IEA says resuming strait flows is ‘the single most important variable’ in the global economy. The toll model is the institutional answer the report doesn’t provide.
40 nations are meeting to plan a ‘purely defensive multinational mission’ for Hormuz. The initiative gets three things right — and is missing one critical piece: the funding mechanism that a structured toll system provides.
On April 15 the President said the war was ‘close to over,’ the Pentagon said the blockade had ‘completely halted’ Iranian sea trade, and marine traffic data showed sanctioned tankers transiting Hormuz anyway. All three are true. The contradiction is the structural cost of doing without a neutral chokepoint authority.
On 6 April 2026, President Trump publicly endorsed the idea of charging tolls for Hormuz transit — the first sitting US president to do so. Iran is already improvising fees of $1M+ per ship. Both versions are unworkable. The Suez and Panama models show what a real chokepoint authority looks like.
When QatarEnergy halted Ras Laffan production in March 2026, the disruption hit fertilizer markets as hard as energy. The toll system’s m³-based LNG pricing and 5% eco-vessel rebate are designed for exactly this category of risk.
Private war-risk insurance hit 5% of hull value during the 2026 crisis, with cover withdrawing entirely at the peak. A structured 4% toll surcharge delivers the same risk function at a fraction of the cost — and actually funds the security capability.
The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis exposed three failures: no risk-pricing mechanism, no coordinated escort capacity, and no vessel prioritization. A structured toll model addresses each of them.