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The deal includes a $300 billion Reconstruction and Development Fund — a private investment vehicle, over half committed, replacing Iran’s original $400 billion war-damage demand. Read against the crisis, the fund is the legitimate alternative to the Hormuz toll: it supplies the reconstruction capital the toll was meant to extract, by investment rather than by taxing global trade. If the fund fills, the economic rationale for the toll evaporates — strengthening the case for a minimal service fee. But Gulf hesitation is the fault line.

Brent closed at $83 the day after the deal and fell below $78 by 18 June — the war premium gone, and most of the ~$20 institutional premium the site identified at $91 gone too, leaving roughly $6-10. But the deal deferred the institutional question: the service fee, the administering body, the mines, the 60-day cliff. This post asks whether the market has priced out a risk the deal didn’t resolve, and reads the sticky residual as the institutional floor under the price.

The contemplated MOU pledges to restore prewar shipping — about 150 vessels a day — within 30 days of signing. The strait is currently running at about two transits a day after 94 days of paralysis. This post reads the reopening as the logistics problem it is: a ~2,000-vessel queue unwind, an insurance market that normalises only on a track record, and the question of who actually sequences it all when the strait’s only candidate authority is SDN-designated.

Brent fell to about $91 in late May 2026, down roughly 19 per cent on the month on optimism over a ‘largely negotiated’ deal. The deflation from the $126 peak separates two risks that were previously bundled: about $35 of war-and-blockade premium has left, while roughly $20 a barrel of institutional premium stays. That residual — about $2 billion a day — is the price of the institutional gap, now visible directly in the crude strip.

On 10 May 2026, the Qatari LNG carrier Al Kharaitiyat transited Hormuz on the Tehran-approved corridor to Pakistan under a government-to-government LNG arrangement. The transit is the cleanest available case study of the bilateral carve-out pattern. This post reads the transit in detail, explains why the bilateral mechanism cannot scale to the broader LNG market, and identifies what an institutional default would replace it with.

On 18-19 May 2026, Iranian state-affiliated reporting disclosed ‘Hormuz Safe,’ a crypto-settled state-backed marine insurance product for vessels using the PGSA corridor. The launch lands the day after the PGSA formal announcement. This post reads what Hormuz Safe can and cannot do relative to the International Group P&I cover the global operator class actually uses, and what a treaty-backed authority would do differently.

Additional War Risk Premiums on Gulf tanker transits sit around 1% of hull value per seven-day period, with stranded tankers paying up to 10%. All 12 International Group P&I Clubs gave 72 hours’ notice cancelling parts of war cover in the Gulf. The underwriter-side gatekeeping is, in effect, a chokepoint closure no government has formally declared. This post reads what an institutional answer would change about that.

Brent rose about 3.8 per cent on 4 May 2026 after the Project Freedom announcement and an Iranian missile claim, after pulling toward $108 earlier in the week on peace-proposal hopes. Earlier posts have documented the chokepoint risk premium as a level. This post documents it as a volatility — a directly priced cost in hedging premia, surcharge widths, insurance loadings, and rate-case adjustments that accrues every day the institutional state of the chokepoint is undefined.

Brent touched $126 overnight on April 30 — highest since 2022 — before pulling back to about $114. Both halves of the move are informative. The spike priced an option that the Iranian new-chapter announcement and the US blockade extension might converge into further escalation; the pullback un-priced part of that option as the news cycle settled. The chokepoint risk premium is now the marginal component of global crude price.

On April 29, real-time tracking showed three to eight Hormuz transits in 24 hours against a pre-crisis baseline of about 60 vessels per day. Five per cent of normal. The post walks through what is and is not still moving, what a treaty-backed authority’s monthly statistical bulletin would record, and why the throughput floor is an institutional fact rather than only a military one.